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DeFunis, The Equal Protection Dilemma:
Affirmative Action and Quotas
James T. Flaherty*
Kevin Sheard**
A relatively unknown suit reached a temporary conclusion in March,
1973 when a decision was handed down by the Washington State Su-
preme Court. Obscure though it may have been, DeFunis v. Odegaard'
parallels another initially obscure case, Brown v. Board of Education.2
Its final determination by the United States Supreme Court will set a
pattern for generations to come, relative to "reverse discrimination" as
a constitutional method of dealing with de facto disadvantage caused
without state connivance.
The events which led to this suit began in 1970 when Mr. Marco
DeFunis applied for admission to the class of 1973 at the University of
Washington's Law School at Seattle, Washington. By objective stan-
dards, his high expectations of an invitation to matriculate appeared
not unwarranted. His grade point average (GPA) had been 3.62 on a
4.0 scale for his four undergraduate years at the University of Wash-
ington;8 he had graduated in June' 1970 with high honors (Phi Beta
Kappa and Magna Cum Laude) and had scored 668 in his third and
* B.S., Boston College 1951; M. Ed., Boston College 1953; J.D., Boston College 1964;
Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
** B.A., Williams College 1947; M.S., University of Wisconsin 1949; M.B.A.,
Xavier University 1955; J.D., Loyola of Chicago School of Law 1959; Professor of Law,
Cleveland State University College of Law.
1. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). For the purposes of this article, unless otherwise indicated, the term "Brown" will
refer to both cases as an integrated unit.
3. The data supplied here comes from the Brief for Respondents & Brief for Appellants,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
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last Law School Admission Test (LSAT). Included with this score were
two previous LSAT results so that he had an overall average of 582.
By these criteria, his potential for a successful performance at the Uni-
versity of Washington Law School in the study of law was high.
Like its counterpart in many law schools, the University of Wash-
ington Admissions Committee ranked individual applicants on the
basis of the projected first year average (PFYA). This is determined by
a formula which includes, in this situation, the objective variables of
junior-senior GPA (in Mr. DeFunis' case 3.71) and LSAT score, or
average score if more than one LSAT examination was taken within a
specified period. These factors gave Mr. DeFunis a projected first year
average of 76.23. At the University of Washington Law School, a PFYA
of 77 or above meant automatic or nearly automatic acceptance. A
PFYA of 74.4 or below meant automatic rejection. Applications with
a PFYA in the brackets between 74.5 and 76.99 were held aside for
further consideration by the committee.
The University of Washington, like most law schools throughout
the country, was experiencing a substantial increase in the number of
applicants and thus was forced to make various subjective decisions
for some individuals in order to limit the entrants to the first year class
from the many eligible candidates. Marco DeFunis was among those
rejected. Thereupon, according to him, the university suggested he
reapply for the class which would commence study in the fall of 1971
(the graduating class of 1974).
During the period between his denial of admission to the class of
1973 and the decision on his application for the class of 1974, Mr.
DeFunis engaged in twenty-four hours of graduate study in another
discipline. At the same time, he was employed in a full-time job during
the day. He achieved 21 credit hours of "A," and 3 credit hours of
"Inc." This information was forwarded to the Admissions Committee
as further evidence of his superior academic ability. Apparently, how-
ever, it was not persuasive, for he was notified in August that he had
again been refused admission to the law school. Previous to this second
rejection, or shortly thereafter, he became aware of the Council of
Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO) program for admission of minor-
ity students to the university's law school.4 This program was the
4. CLEO is made up of representatives from the American Bar Association (ABA),
American Association of Law Schools (AALS), National Bar Association (NBA), and Law
School Admission Test Council (LSATC). See I COUNCIL ON LI.A EDuc. 1 (1968).
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product of the affirmative action efforts endorsed by the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 5 (HEW) pursuant to
executive order,6 to afford individuals of designated minority groups
equalizing opportunities to enter various occupations.
The underlying CLEO philosophy, with respect to admissions cri-
teria, contends that objective standards are not truly indicative of po-
tential performance in law school for individuals from culturally
deprived and/or oppressed minorities. The CLEO program is geared
towards providing legal education, which might otherwise be denied
to members of these minorities if determinations were made solely on
the basis of the usual objective information. Thus, when a member
of the designated minority groups is an applicant, his record is given
special attention beyond the undergraduate GPA and LSAT score to
find other evidence of potential success in law school-subjective
criteria.
The compensatory admissions policies of the University of Washing-
ton Law School act in favor of four denominated groups: Blacks, Chi-
canos, American Indians, and Filipinos.7 Any individual who is within
one of these groups automatically has his application set aside for
special consideration by the use of so-called subjective factors:
In assessing qualifications we began by trying to identify appli-
cants who had the potential for outstanding performance in law
school. We attempted to select applicants for admission from that
group on the basis of their ability to make significant contributions
to law school classes and to the community at large.8
An applicant's ability to make significant contributions to law
school and the community at large was assessed from such factors
as his extracurricular and community activities, employment, and
general background.
We gave no preference to, but did not discriminate against, either
Washington residents or women in making our determinations.
An applicant's racial or ethnic background was considered as one
factor in our general attempt to convert formal credentials into
realistic predictions.9
5. See Raab, Quotas by Any Other Name, 54 GOMME.NTARY 41 (Jan. 1972); Can All
Americans Be Made "Equal"?, U.S. News & World Report, Apr. 9, 1973, at 39; Memorandum
to Colleges & University Presidents, from J. Stanley Pottinger, Director of the Office for
Civil Rights, H.E.W. (Oct. 1972).
6. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965).
7. Brief for Appellants at 5, Brief for Respondents at 4, DeFunis v. Odegaard 82 Wash.
2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
8. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Wash. 1973).
9. Id. at 1174.
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Thus, the University sought to achieve a reasonable representation
within the student body of persons from these groups which have
been historically suppressed by encouraging their enrollment
within the various programs offered at the University. Policies for
admission of minorities throughout the University recognized that
the conventional "mechanical" credentializing system does not
always produce good indicators of the full potential of such cul-
turally separated or deprived individuals, and that to rely solely
on such formal credentials could well result in unfairly denying to
qualified minority persons the chance to pursue the educational
opportunities available at the University.
The Law School sought to carry forward this University policy in
its admission program, not only to obtain a reasonable representa-
tion from minorities within its classes, but to increase participation
within the legal profession by persons from racial and ethnic
groups which have been historically denied access to the profession
and which, consequently, are grossly underrepresented within the
legal system. In doing so, the Admissions Committee followed
certain procedures which are the crux of plaintiff's claimed denial
of equal protection of the laws. 10
There is no way of knowing what these factors are, since they are the
personal reactions of the committee members to some random or chance
item in the application, but are generally called extracurricular. 1 In
any event, it is not unfair to say that the "subjective criteria group" is
qualified by considerations of race and national origin.
Upon inquiry, Mr. DeFunis discovered that of the initial invitees,
44 were of the designated minority status. Of these 44 invited, 6 had
a higher PFYA than he, whereas 38 had a lower PFYA. Some of these
scores were in fact as low as 67.61. Of the entire class of the 275 invited,
74 had a lower PFYA than DeFunis, 36 of these 74 were of the denomi-
nated minority classes. Twenty-two of the remaining 38 were previous
admittees who had had their admissions to the law school delayed due
to military service. The remaining 16 were found worthy based on ad-
ditional information in their file.12
These figures firmed up DeFunis's hypothesis that the only reasons
that particular minority group members with lesser credentials were
admitted and he was not were the color of his skin and the spelling of
his last name. He saw himself as being denied acceptance to the law
school because he was Caucasian and not a member of an officially
10. Id. at 1175.
11. Id. at 1187, 1193-96.
12. See note 3 supra.
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designated priority background. Based on this premise, he initiated
legal action and obtained an order from the Washington court direct-
ing the President of the University and the Dean of the law school to
admit him to the class entering in the fall of 1971.
The court order was based on the finding that DeFunis had been
denied equal protection under the fourteenth amendment because he
was white, and not of a designated minority, and the view of the district
judge that the Constitution is colorblind.18 This lower court's decision
was appealed by the state and the university to the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington.
Although Mr. DeFunis was in law school when the appeal reached
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, it elected to hear the
matter because of the importance of the issues involved.1 4
On March 8, 1973, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that
the state had in fact classified on'race, color, and national origin bases,
and that Mr. DeFunis had been the object of discrimination because
of his race (or non-race).15 Therefore, the scheme fell into a constitu-
tionally suspect classification. It was necessary for the State to prove not
only the rational basis, but further, a compelling state interest. By con-
centrating on the implied purpose of bringing the races together, the
court was easily satisfied that the compelling state interest had been
successfully proven.'8 Thus, the result and the philosophy of the lower
court were reversed.
This decision clearly placed a stamp of approval on a matter on which
the Supreme Court of the United States has never ruled. It has become
a convenient vehicle for a Supreme Court ruling on the constitutional-
ity of preferential affirmative action for minorities,' 7 i.e., "reverse dis-
crimination."'s
While Brown decreed discriminations and classifications based on
race to be illegal, the Washington Supreme Court now claims that racial
and ethnic discriminations against the non-official priority groups are
legally acceptable so long as the discrimination is designed to assist in
13. 507 P.2d at 1178.
14. Id. at 1177 n.6.
15. Id. at 1177.
16. Id. at 1181.
17. Id.
18. See note 5 supra. See also Cook, School Segregation: To Brown and Back Again-
The Great Circle, 23 BAY. L. REv. 398 (1971); McAuliffe, School Segregation: The Problem
of Compensatory Discrimination, 57 VA. L REv. 65 (1971); Comment, Increasing Minority
Admissions in Law School-Reverse Discrimination?, 20 BUFF. L REv. 473 (1971).
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a blending of the races.19 That view is a gross over-simplification to the
point of misrepresentation. The statement can only mean that such
racial discrimination is legally acceptable when it acts in favor of those
certain officially designated priority groups and against the officially
non-designated object group.
It may be of value to pause and reflect on how the group obtained
such official standing to serve as a basis for a compelling state interest.
In the. DeFunis situation, the University Law School Faculty merely
voted to carve out such a group and decided the appropriate benefit. 20
Since the law faculty was at a state institution, the state supreme court
in effect considered this faculty action to be state action, then went for-
ward to find a compelling state purpose.2'
Brown may have intended to equalize the races in the eyes of the law,
but it decreed only educational segregation based on race to be uncon-
stitutional.2 2 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare de-
cided to equalize the races by the issuance of numerous "regulations"
which were designed and implemented to force equalization, by force or
coercion.2 3 Then, by adoption of the term "affirmative action," state
and private concerns were "induced" to accept racial and ethnic
quotas.24
HEW then moved into racial quotas at educational institutions
under threat of withdrawal of HEW funds, the lifeline of many private
institutions.2 5
The concept of affirmative action was developed from the practice of
the judiciary in de jure discrimination cases to impose racial quotas on
students and faculty in the desegregation process and to avoid further
racial harm in those de jure cases. 26 Those same courts have been
careful to avoid judicial intervention in cases of de facto segregation
where there had been no finding of de jure segregation.2 7
19. 507 P.2d at 1181. It has been suggested that there is a duty on state law schools
to follow the DeFunis theory. See Comment, Increasing Minority Admissions in Law School
-Reverse Discrimination?, 20 BUFF. L. REv. 473, 486 (1971).
20. Brief for Appellants at 4, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
21. In fact, there was no issue of state action as all parties had conceded it to be such.
82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
22. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HIGHER EDUCA-
ION GUIDELINES (Oct. 1972).
24. Seabury, H.E.W. &" The University, 54 COMMENTARY 30 (Feb. 1972).
25. Id.; Can All Americans Be Made "Equal'?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 9,
1973, at 39.
26. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. (1964); United States v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
27. Spencer. v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), afl'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972); Bell
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The new HEW affirmative action demands racial quotas and com-
pensatory action without any finding of de jure segregation. In effect,
this type of compensatory action is now legislation by regulations
created by any state agency and given judicial sanction as state action
and a compelling state interest.
If employees28 of any governmental unit can merely design a regula-
tion and implement their guidelines by calling it a compelling state
interest, then such employees are not only making law (legislating) but
may now make any law they choose, as long as they can convince the-
judiciary that it is for a good purpose. If the judiciary likes the idea, it
will merely make a finding of a compelling state interest. One con-
stitutional lawyer may suggest it is a combination of administrative and
ad hoc state and federal agencies and employees joining with a sym-
pathetic judiciary to ignore or replace articles I and I of the United
States Constitution.29 Another constitutional lawyer may just as ra-
tionally view this as proper functions of administrative agencies being
properly supported by a strict constructionist judiciary. These views are
on a collision course and may be considered as the irresistible force
meeting the immovable object-only one can conceptually survive.
The principal concern of this article is the other legal issue involved.
Pre-Brown law held discrimination against non-whites as permissible.
Brown held no racial discrimination in education is permissible where
state action is involved. DeFunis now holds that discrimination against
whites is permissible as long as it is in favor of the "official" designated
priority groups. The interesting and critical legal point is whether this
type of "reverse discrimination" is contrary to Brown, or whether it is
merely an appropriate implementation of Brown.
I. EQUAL PRoTEcrION
A. Prior to Brown v. Board of Education
The natural starting point for any discussion of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment (applicable to education) is Plessy
v. Ferguson,30 decided in 1896. There, the basic issue was: "May a State
v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.). aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964).
28. Whatever else the faculty of a state university may be, they are at least employees
of the state as opposed to agents of the state.
29. U.S. CONSr., arts. I-II.
30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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classify and separate its citizens on the basis of their race or color?" The
factual background showed that the plaintiff had been -assigned to the
"Colored Peoples'" car by train officials pursuant to a state law which
required segregation of the races on public transportation.31 Plaintiff's
refusal to move from the "White coach" led to his arrest, ejection
from the train, and imprisonment in the parish jail to await trial for
violation of the Louisiana statute.
-Plaintiff's first allegation was that the decision classifying him as
"Colored" was erroneous as he was seven-eighths White.3 2 The
Supreme Court, holding that the mathematics of color was exclusively
a -state concern, refused to consider this point. His second allegation
was that even if he had been correctly classified, the process itself, in
reality the Louisiana statute, was void as it violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 3 The Supreme Court held
that the Louisiana statute was valid in that the state could classify its
citizens by race and then physically separate them on public transporta-
tion facilities, as long as the separate facilities were equal.34 Any feeling
of inferiority that may have resulted, stated the Court, was by the
Negro's own inference, and was not in the statute by implication.33
Thug, the doctrine of "separate but equal," and the state's right to
classify by race received the approval of a post fourteenth amendment
Supreme Court. Though the facts in Plessy pertained to railroad
passenger classification and separation, the doctrine was all that was
necessary to permit the continuation of "Jim Crow" laws vitally
affecting the black (or at least non-white) American citizen.3 6 Even a
cursory knowledge of subsequent American history shows the emphasis
on the separation rather than'the "equality." Practically, the doctrine
meant continued second class citizenship; in its application to the
educational field it left little or no real opportunity for self improve-
ment.
The Plessy decision was not without its critics. On the Supreme
Court itself, Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a vigorous dissent:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There
31. id. at 538-39.
32. Id. at 541.
33. 1d. at 542.
34. Id. at 544.
35. Id. at 551.
36. Cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
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is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the
most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaran-
teed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore,
to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the
fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is
competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their
civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove
to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in
the DRED SCOTT CASE.3 7
This ringing affirmation of a faith was addressed to the nation in
1896. A procession of cases gradually eroding the central doctrine of
Plessy has confirmed the soundness of Harlan's belief in its potential
evil and the basic unconstitutionality of state classification and dis-
crimination based on race.
Once the "separate but equal" justification for state racial classifica-
tion was accepted by the Supreme Court, it was inevitable that it be
extended to the field of public education. Not surprisingly, when the
time for Supreme Court challenges to the separate but equal doctrine
finally arrived, they centered on the graduate and professional levels
where facilities were more limited, inequality more obvious, and the
Non-whites less submissive.
In 1938 the Supreme Court decided the case of Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada.38 The state of Missouri had segregated educational
facilities for the races through the graduate level, but had failed to
provide a law school for Blacks. Those desiring an education in the
professional field were barred from the "White only" schools. To avoid
the charge of unequal opportunity, the legislature created a plan
whereby a Negro who wanted a legal education could attend a law
school in some other state that would accept him, and the state of
Missouri would pay his tuition.3 9 Missouri argued that this plan con-
formed to Plessy, because it provided "equality" in that both races had
access to legal education, albeit in separate states.
Notwithstanding the benevolent offer of the taxpayers' money for
37. 163 US. at 559.
38. 305 US. at 337 (1938).
39. Id. at 342-43.
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going elsewhere, Mr. Gaines felt that- his- rights, under the equil pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, were being violated. The
United States .Supreme Court agreed. It held that a state may. not
require one. of its citizens who seeks a state-sponsored legal education to
go ouiside its boundaries merely because of his race. To force him to
do so was a denial of equal educational opportunities.40 The Court
carefully avoided the race issue, and relied* on equality among citizens,
not races. This decision was by 1938 criteria, a'revolutionary decision
-by 1974 standards, an evasion of the real issue.
The Supreme. Court continued on this path of full educational op-
portunity at the law school level when in.1948 it decided the case of
Sipuel v. Board of Regents.41 There a black female had been denied
admission to the University of Oklahoma, the state's only law- school,
because of her color. In a per curiam decision, it was stated -that the
petitioner was entitled to secure a legal education which had been
denied to her while it was afforded' to others during the same period.42
This was a violation of the Constitution as the "... State must provide
it for her in conformity With the equal protection clause .. and ..
the same as it [the state] does for applicants of any other group."'- It
will be noted that in both the Gaines and Sipuel cases there were no
separate law school facilities available for the plaintiffs. Those within
the state were for Whites only.
Perhaps if these states had foreseen the impact of these decisions they
would have provided separate facilities and avoided- those confronta-
tions which later became a social and legal base for Brown.44
Events now moved more swiftly as ai increasing number of Blacks
sought higher education. In the case of Sweatt v. Painter,45 another
Plessy-type issue was brought to the Court in 1950. Plaintiff, a- black
citizen of Texas, desired to attend the University of Texas Law School.
At that time, there was a proposal for a separate law school for Blacks
within the framework of the University of Texas. Sweatt was therefore
denied admission to the existing (white) law school on racial grounds,
though he was otherwise qualified. 46 Texas had obviously learned the
40. Id. at 349-50.
41. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
42. Id. at 632-33.
43. Id. at 631.
44. Cf. Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
45. 339 US. 629 (1950).
46. Id. at 631.
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lessons of Gaines and Sipuel, but was not yet prepared to take the next
logical step.
While the suit wound 'its way toward the Supreme Court, Texas
abandoned its plan for a black division at the University of Texas and
created, on paper at least, a state supported law school for Blacks called
the Texas State University for Negroes.
The Supreme Court took a hard cold look at reality and the intangi-
bles of "equality" when they compared the facilities available for
Whites and for Blacks. For the former, at the University of Texas,
there was a full time faculty of 15 professors, a student body of 850 and
over 65,000 volumes in the library; for the latter, there were only 5
full time professors, a student body of 23, and less than 17,000,volumes
in the library. Further, the "Black School" lacked accreditation and
had only one alumnus.47 In terms of these tangibles the University of
Texas was superior, but the court delved even deeper.
The University of Texas had a faculty of high reputation, an experi-
enced administration, influential alumni, and traditions' of standing
and prestige. The new law school for "Blacks only" lacked any of ihese
intangible qualities. The obvious inequalities were summarized by
Chief Justice Vinson when he stated, "It is difficult to believe that one
who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the
question close. ' 48 The Court ordered that the plaintiff be admitted
to the University of Texas.49
On the same day that it decided Sweatt, the Supreme Court also held
in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education5o that
once a Black had been admitted to a state university he must be afforded
equality within the institution. Mr. G. W. McLaurin had been ad-
mitted to the University of Oklahoma in pursuit of a Doctor of Edu-
cation degree, but once there he was subjected to certain practices of
segregation. He was assigned a special seat in the library separate from
facilities open to white students; he could wait in -the cafeteria, lines
with white students, but he had to remain apart while eating. Initially
he had to sit alone in the classroom behind a rail which bore a sign
reading "Reserved for Colored"; later, the rail was removed and he
was the sole occupant of a row of seats reserved for "colored students'.';
in some instances he was even forced to sit outside the door.51
47. Id. at 632-33.
48. Id. at 634.
49. Id. at 642.
50. 339 U.S. 637- (1950).
51. Id. at 641.
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Chief Justice Vinson noted that such restrictions ".... impair and in-
hibit [plaintiff's] ability to study, to engage in discussion and exchange
views with other. students, and, in general to learn his profession." 52
He went on to point out that the nation was in need of trained leaders,
especially in education. Inevitably, (and perhaps incidentally to Mc-
Laurin's rights) in these circumstances "those who will come under
his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the education
he receives."5 The conclusion was inescapable. The total treatment was
unequal and thus unconstitutional. Through Sweatt and McLaurin
the Court had demonstrated that "separate but equal" was a very diffi-
cult concept to maintain, at least in the field of education.
In its holding, the Court took notice of the social problems that in-
dividual Blacks might face and, referring to Shelley v. Kramer,5 recog-
nized a constitutional difference between attitudes of social groups and
state enforcement of those attitudes. However powerless the Court
might be. as to the former, it could and would prohibit the latter when,
as state action, it constituted a violation of the fourteenth amendment.55
A hint of things to come was the reference in these two cases to the
fact that a significant proportion of the population had been systemati-
cally denied the opportunity for higher education.50 This 1950 Court
had completely negated Plessy in the field of higher education. It re-
quired no great gift of prophecy to foresee the eventual application of
the principle of these cases to elementary and secondary education.
Brown was only three years away.
B. Brown v. Board of Education57
The issue of "separate but equal" as applied in education was finally
met head-on in May, 1954, when the Supreme Court handed down its
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
55. Id. at 13-14.
56. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1948);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1948).
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is not the purpose of this article to exhaustively discuss pre
and post Brown, but only to highlight the aspects of those cases as they may be relevant to
DeFunis. For further investigation and/or background there are a number of excellent books
and artides in the area; see generally A. B. BLAUSTEIN & C. FERGusoN, JR., DESEGREGATION
& THs LAW (2d ed. 1962); 1- FstwmmN, ARGUMENT (1969); B. ScHwARTz, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1968); UNITED STATES CoMMIssION ON CIVn
RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION Of THE LAWS IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION (reprint 1968); Carter,
An Evaluation of Past and Current Legal Approaches to Vindication of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Educational Opportunity, 1972 WASH. LQ. 479; Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw.
U.L REV. 157 (1963).
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decision in Brown v. the Board of Education.58 The holding stated:
"we conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of sepa-
rate but equal has no place. Separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal." 59 Although later cases assumed it contained a more
sweeping mandate, Brown was in fact limited to the field of public
education.'* For purposes of the DeFunis issue, the Brown decision is
important for what it said, and even more important for what it did not
say. The decisions of the subsequent two decades have gone beyond the
language of Brown to close gaps left by the decision.
Under the general heading of Brown there were four cases from
various parts of the country concerning the doctrine of "separate but
equal" in elementary and secondary education. 6' The Brown Court
looked beyond the tangibles to the intangibles, a device that had been
introduced a few years before in Sweatt and McLaurin. It noted that
the history of the fourteenth amendment does not indicate that there
was any expressed intention to affect public education. Then it went
on to weigh the six cases that had been decided since Plessy and their
handling of "separate but equal." Each of those cases had skirted around
the basic issue of whether the "separate but equal" doctrine applied to
education. This was accomplished by finding other ways to rationalize
the result without actually disturbing Plessy.
This Court elected to look to the effect of segregation itself on public
education. The issue as stated by the Court was: "Does the segregation
of children in public schools, solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal, deprive
the minority group of equal educational opportunity?" 2
The Court noted in its answer to that question many considerations
which are important for a realistic understanding of the roles of state
and local government in education, which was duly indicated as one of
the most important functions of those bodies. The Court stated, "In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he or she is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion .... To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. Id. at 495.
60. Id. at 494-95.
61. Besides Brown there was Briggs v. Elliott, from the Eastern District Court of South
Carolina, Davis v. County School Bd., from the Eastern District Court of Virginia, and
Gebhart v. Belton, from the Supreme Court of Delaware. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. 347 U.S. at 493.
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status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."O The Court went on to hold "that the
Plaintiffs ... [were] deprived of the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."64
Realizing the importance of their decision and the awesome impact
it would have on educational systems of the nation, the Court invited
a number of state attorneys-general, as well as other interested parties,
to appear as amici curiae on how to enforce what became known as
Brown 1.65 The basic decision which emerged as Brown II was to re-
mand the cases to the lower courts from which they came with instruc-
tions to use equitable principles in enforcing the transition to racially
non-discriminatory schools.66
Thus the local federal district courts were given a mandate by the
Supreme Court to do away with public schools maintained on a segre-
gated basis and, by utilizing equitable principles, to establish unitary
school systems. 67 Cases following the Brown decisions dealt with allega-
tions of practical barriers to immediate desegregation, 6 judicial decrees
designed to force recalcitrant school districts to accept Brown or to
assist cooperative educational authorities,69 to investigate and stop the
various schemes employed by school authorities to avoid the Brown
mandate,70 and methods by which the school authorities might or must
implement the letter and spirit of Brown.71 It is in this latter area that
the issues for the DeFunis dilemma were being nurtured. The methods
utilized to create the unitary school system evolved into what is called,
by the plaintiff in DeFunis, a new form of denial of equal protection,
that of "reverse discrimination." It is important to determine whether
this allegation is a frustration of the "equitable principles" proposed
63. Id.
64. Id. at 495. The Brown opinion, it should be noted, confined its abrogation of the
Plessy doctrine to the field of education alone. Other applications of the doctrine were
untouched by this 1954 decision.
65. Id. at 495-96.
66. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
67. Id. at 300.
68. See Keyes v. School Dist., 396 U.S. 1215 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 19
(1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
69. See Jefferson Parish School Bd. v. Davis, 404 U.S. 1219 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
70. See Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Keyes v. School
Dist., 396 US. 1215 (1969); Green v. County School Bd, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
71. See Bradley v. Milliken, 345. F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Bradley v. School Bd.,
338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972); Mapp v. Board of Educ.,
329 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Tenn. 1971), afl'd, 447 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973).
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by Brown, or merely a normal' and regular implementation of them.
In DeFunis, the issue joined on that point.
C. Post-Brown
'The activity following Brown can be divided into three general
phases. The immediate post-Brown cases involved a concentration on
the elimination of state supported segregated educational' institutions
by the destruction of excuses for delay. The watch-word was, in effect,
"end Segregation." Griffin v. School Board72 and Green v. County School
Board73 may be considered as the beginning of the second phase: the
elimination of the racial segregation effects remaining after Brown.
This phase was characterized in the lower courts 'by such devices as
open enrollment, 74 re-districting,75 racial- quotas to reflect the general
community pattern, 7  and bussing. 77
The third phase was an outgrowth of the second. It was discovered-
that the previous concentration on the establishment of "racially non-
discriminatory schools"78 did:not solve the problemof individual and
group educational disadvantages which had resulted from segregation
practices. School systems, recognizing the educational lag, began re-
medial programs to compensate for the educational disadvantage in-
duced by segregation. These types of programs can generally be called
"compensatory education" programs.79 .
. The attempts at combining racially (and ethnic).unitary schools and
compensatory programs were soon found to be an incomplete solution
72. 377 Us. 218 (1964).
73. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
74. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
75. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. .1966), cert.
denied sub nom. Board of Educ. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
76. United States v. Montgomery: County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969). But see
Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
77. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Mapp v. Board of
Educ., 477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973).
78 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
79. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Keyes y. School Dist., 396 U.S.
1215 (1969). See generally Carter, An Evaluation of Past and Current Legal Approaches
to Vindication of the Fourteenth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity, 1972 WASH. LQ. 479; Cook, School Desegregation: To Brown and Back 'Again-
The Great Circle, 23 BAY L. Rav. 398 (1971); Ijalae, Concessional Admission of' Under-
privileged Students, 20 BuFF. L. REv. (1971); O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing
Access to Legal Education, 1970 TOL. L Ray. 281; O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equal-
izing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971); Preyer,
Beyond Desegregation-What Ought to be Done?, 51 N.C.L. REv. 657 (1973); Comment,
From Brown to Swann-The New Role of Equity in Integration, 23 BAY. L. REv. 555




as they did not, by themselves, open the doors to full and equal em-
ployment and educational opportunity. More was needed. The next
(and present) phase may be characterized as affirmative action programs.
These programs are already in existence, by force of law and adminis-
trative fiat, in employment 0 and, unofficially, in educational institu-
tions."'
It is a characteristic of affirmative action programs that they do not
require any findings of either de jure or de facto segregation on the
local scene. It is sufficient that there be a disproportionately small mi-
nority representation in a given field at the national level.82 To qualify
as a beneficiary of an affirmative action program, one need only be a
member of any of the numerous officially designated "minority groups"
without any hint or suggestion of personal disadvantage. Members of
these groups-paupers, middle class, and millionaires alike-automati-
cally qualify for affirmative action benefits.
Affirmative action is a positive corrective technique designed to com-
pensate for the results of years of segregation. All "other Whites" (those
not included in the priority groups), particularly those in the educa-
tional or employment fields, regardless of whether they or their ances-
tors engage in segregation, are now under some disadvantage due to
affirmative action programs. Among others, who throughout the coun-
try alleged invidious discrimination due to race by virtue of such pro-
grams, was one Mr. Marco DeFunis, an applicant for the University
of Washington Law School.
His claim, in effect, is that he was told to step aside; his opportunity
for a legal education went to another who had the benefits of affirma-
tive action. Anyone in the DeFunis situation may cry, "Why me? My
family never owned slaves. I never discriminated against anyone, why
me?"' 3 There is no single answer. Justifications given can be appre-
ciated only in the contexts of ends and means in sociology and the law.
80. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 US. 424 (1971); Abrams, The Quota Commission,
54 CoMMENTARY 54 (1972).
81. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
82. Raab, Quotas by Any Other Name, 53 COMMENTARY 41 (Oct. 1972).
83. See Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1973) (Weick & O'Sullivan,
JJ., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (1973) (Hale, CJ., dissenting);
McAuliffe, School Desegregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination, 57 VA.
L REV. 65, 89 (1971); Raab, Quotas by Any Other Name, 53 COMLNmrrARY 41, 43 (Jan.
1972).
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II. SOCIOLOGY ...
No one can honestly deny that the designated minority groups have
suffered greatly because of past segregation in areas of employment,
purchase of real estate, trade and craft unions, and in higher education.
It is probable that the less obvious indignities, motivated by traditional
ethnic prejudices, have had even more significant psychological impact
on the minority individual and group ego image. 4 Although anyone
could point to exceptions to this general rule, their visibility only helps
to prove the fact.
When he was "desegregated" in 1954, no door of career opportunity
swung open for the new "freedman" who was generally unqualified to
go on into higher education or become an apprentice in a trade, or
enter a profession. The new freedom was not accompanied by any
proverbial "forty acres and a mule." For those older minority group
members caught in the educational lag, the new freedom proved to be
illusory.85 The admittedly deficient education, which resulted from the
segregated schools or from lack of motivation due to frustration, was
the very thing that prevented him from competing as an equal in higher
education and employment. He is still not able to take advantage of
this new opportunity to improve himself. Still not able to engage in
upward mobility, he is, in effect, frozen at his present socio-economic
level. In the long run, his plight affects not only himself but also his
children, who cannot help but be influenced by their socio-economic-
cultural environment. In a sense, his former old fashioned personal
"box" trap has merely been recognized to be circular in effect.
This circular trap has been the problem with many minorities, par-
ticularly Blacks and American Indians. Although legal barriers had
been removed, the social and economic barriers remained. There are
those who liken this circle to a ring of steel, others claim it to be largely
imaginary. Nevertheless, the immobility circle exists, whatever its
holding power, as there are large numbers of minority group members
of this last generation who are unable to move from their socio-eco-
84. Note, DeFacto School Segregation and the "State Action" Requirement: A Suggested
New Approach, 48 IND. L.J. 304, 308 (1973).
85. Carter, An Evaluation of Past and Current Legal Approaches to Vindication of the




nomic substrata. As a means of breaking this circle, the concept of affir-
mative action was introduced.
The underlying premise of affirmative action is to make the change
(from exclusion to inclusion in the main stream in American life) as
fast as possible through private and governmental action. It is a policy
of' correcting the wrongs of centuries by the compensatory actions of
today, one which will produce results not merely "with all deliberate
speed," but with solutions that will "work and ... work now. 8s6 It is a
policy of priority considerations to those caught in the relative immo-
bility trap. Among all possible career choices, the legal profession is
certainly a most appropriate target of affirmative action, for unlike
most other professions, it contains the power and potential for im-
plementation of affirmative action. In the larger field of general law,
there is a definite need.for inclusion of minority groups, for if minori-
ties are not a part of those making our system of justice work there is
little reason for them to think that the law is cognizant of their needs
and complaint. Indeed, the reverse is more probable. It is a perfectly
understandable reaction of those who see themselves as excluded from
participating in the making and enforcing of laws. The "outs" will
view that law as the means of oppressing and persecuting them. They
will view the legal system as "theirs" rather than "ours."
Nativist Americans to the contrary, the nation today is a blend of
many peoples and cultures who have, each in their own time, made
their own special contributions. The apparent smoothness of the blend
disguises the fact that achieving it was not always an easy process. Any
ethnic of the first or second generation (and occasionally some third or
fourth) can describe various injustices suffered at the hands of the
majority culture during the assimilation period. Further, inter-ethnic
group discriminations were possibly just as savage. Usually, however,
within three or four generations most ethnics adapted to the environ-
ment, became invisible, and thus immune from the consequences of
being "different. '8 7
The groups now officially called "minority group" ethnics have not
been so easily assimilated into the mainstream. Explanations are legion.
On one extreme is the view that "they" do not want to join the main-
stream, on the other is the view that "they" have been barred from it.
86. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968), quoted in DeFunis v. Ode!
gaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1180 (1973).
87. See generally M. NOVAK, THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS (1972).
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Unfortunately, the elusive truth is somewhere between these extremes.
History has shown the former view to have been popular through the
1930's. Gradually the latter became prevalent, culminating in Brown.
Which view will prevail in the long run must be left to history.
What is in issue today, particularly in DeFunis, is the morality or
legality of the present "reverse" discrimination created as an affirmative
action device as atonement for past "obverse" discrimination. Past dis-
crimination has been held to be immoral, invidious, illegal and uncon-
stitutional. The present discrimination is held to be moral, non-invidi-
ous, legal, and constitutional because it serves a "compelling state
interest." A non-pragmatic philosopher or legal scholar may find trouble
in a reconciliation of these two views unless he makes a purely subjec-
tive choice of a side, and then rationalizes toward his pre-chosen end.
The basic American culture is English. Bits and pieces of other cul-
tures have been engrafted onto or blended into it. On the whole, it is
still recognized as basically White Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP).
The WASPS, however, although their culture dominates, do not con-
stitute a numerical majority, they are indeed a minority group!
Who then are "the" minorities? First generation ethnic immigrants?
Second generation immigrants? Blacks? Chicanos? Jews? Polish? Hun-
garians? Italians? Indians? Chinese? In fact, they and many, many more
are all members of a minority group. Every "American" belongs to at
least one racial or ethnic minority. By chance the only single clearly
identifiable numerical majority group in the United States is women,
but they too are, for many purposes, a "minority" groupl
Due to the reduced number of immigrants and the increase of inter-
ethnic and inter-racial marriages, the number of "pure" minorities is
diminishing. Oddly, some are increasing as a statistic. If, for example, a
white woman married a black man, no one's status would be changed.
If, however, she were to marry the Spanish surnamed male, she would
be a new addition to that minority group and may now claim her
official affirmative action priority. The traditional classification of
white and non-white further increases official minority group member-
ship, as all children of inter-racial marriages are classified as non-white,
i.e., "minority."
Then of course there is the effect and influence of geographical loca-
tion. Individuals of Japanese descent may be a recognized "minority"
in California and Washington, but not in Hawaii or Montana. French-
Canadians may be a "minority" in Maine, but not even a cognizable
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group in 'Idaho. An individual with a Spanish surname may have a
different impact and reception in New York depending on whether he
is of Puerto Rican or Mexican origin, as compared to his treatment in
New Mexico. In Washington, Filipinos are members of the official
group, but would not even be considered members in Iowa, for ex-
ample. One would be surprised if the Iowa Law School declared Fili-
pinos as a disadvantaged minority there; the Iowa Supreme Court
would be hard pressed to find a compelling state interest. A few groups
have been officially designated by the federal government. They are the
fortunate ones, for like St. Paul, they are "Romans"; they carry their
minorityship throughout the length and breadth of the realm.
Marco DeFunis has been classified as one who is not a member of an
official minority group. This does not mean that he is a member of
the majority, rather he is merely a member of a group not entitled to
priority or privilege because there is no presumption of a history of
discrimination or segregation which adversely affects its members. He
is, ironically, Jewish, descendant of a Sephardic Jew8 whose very exis-
tence as a group had its origins in persecution. Thus, he is a minority
within a minority, but according to the guidelines of the University of
Washington he is not entitled to priorities because membership in that
minority is not sufficient. Had he been a Black or Filipino he certainly
would have been accepted based on his record. He has thus been im-
pliedly told that Jews as a group do not have a past or current history
of discrimination that has resulted in employment or educational
deprivations. The American Jew should be relieved to hear that.8 9
The present affirmative action practices present two long-term socio-
logical considerations. First, the present authority of the DeFunis case,
if followed, permits classification by race and ethnic origins for a com-
pelling state interest. This is a reversion to the 1849 Doctrine of Rob-
erts v. Boston9" (racial classification at the state level for educational
purposes). If affirmed by the United States Supreme Court it will also
mark another reversion, that of federal approval of state-based racial
classification for other purposes, the principal theory of Plessy of 1896,
which incidentally, cited Roberts as precedent. 91 The principle of
88. Brief for Respondents at 21, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169
(1973); Rabinove, Law School Minorities: What Price Admission?, AMERiCA, Apr. 28, 1973,
at 387.
89. See O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Access to Legal Education, 1970
TOL. L REV. 281, 315.
90. 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849).
91. 163 U.S. at 544.
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state-based racial classifications was also in issue in Gaines, Sipuel,
Sweatt, McLaurin, and Brown. Granted, some may find a justifying
distinction between those cases and DeFunis in that the position of the
races has finally been reversed, or, as has also been advanced; that this
reversal merely favors groups which had formerly been disadvantaged.
The reversal has also been justified on the "shackled runner" anal-
ogy, which likens the minority group member to the runner who has
been competing in a race, but handicapped by leg irons. It is not
enough, claim the proponents, to merely strike the manacles. Some type
of affirmative action must be introduced to advance the runner to the
place where he would have been, absent the shackles. Like most analo-
gies, its argumentative force changes with the substitution of different
times, different circumstances and different individuals. Even more
significant is the change in impact according to the views of the au-
dience. There are also those who find no justification in reverse dis-
crimination because they do not believe in racial classifications and
priorities at all. Reverse discrimination has merely reversed the roles
of the races and has revived the question of the morality and legality
of the principles of racial distinctions and discriminations. From this
standpoint, DeFunis has the sociological and legal potential to equal
or surpass Brown in its impact.
Second, America theoretically prides herself on individual achieve-
ment based on individual performance, not on membership in a group.
Grass-roots America believes this country is basically a meritocracy.92
This basic grass-roots philosophy was in some measure responsible for
Brown. Indeed, the "American Dilemma"'  described by Gunnar
Myrdal twenty-five years ago seemed to have been dissolved. At last
there could be harmony between the ideal and the real where Blacks
were concerned.
There is no evidence, however, that the American Creed (Myrdal's
term) is broad enough to encompass "affirmative action." The primary
thrust of the civil rights movement to change the law so as to end the
dominance of one race over another and to establish equality within
the law was in accord with the desire to end the dichotomy between the
American Creed and the harsh realities of practice. In Brown, Myrdal's
American could feel progress had been made. DeFunis raises doubts.
Put another way, there is no reason to believe that grass-roots America
92. See M. NovAK, THE RISE oF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS 97 (1972).
93. 2 G. MYRvAL, AN'AMErCAN DILEMMA, THE PROBLEM & DEMocmcy (1962).
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is ready to accept the policy of affirmative action priority quotas. In
fact, there is growing evidence to the contrary.9 4 The history of the
racial civil rights movements has been to change the law to prevent the
dominant status of one race over another race and to establish an
equality of legal status. This has ironically created a new intangible
power still controlled by Whites in power, who are haunted by "white
guilt" and seek to atone with a self-imposed restitution on the group.
Fortunately for those in charge of determining the terms of the restitu-
tion, payment is to be made by other Whites not in power, or unable
to enter the power structure because they have been told to stand aside.
As a practical matter, few will quarrel with the righteousness of affir-
mative action until it hits "me." When "I" am called upon for "my"
contribution or sacrifice, my turn to pay the damages, "with a little bit,
of luck," as the song goes, "I won't be home." When faced with the
inevitable, however, some will cooperate and boast of it; most will pro-
test on the meritocracy argument. When fate singled out Mr. DeFunis
for his contribution, he protested. This is another side of the DeFunis
situation.
The affirmative action activist cannot reasonably expect those who
have been educated and trained to accept equality to stand silently
aside when told that they are now to be deprived of a right or benefit
because of mandated affirmative action preferences. Though not in in-
tent, but in operation, affirmative action may rationally be viewed as a
superiority granted by the law. This, too, is a sociological aspect of the
DeFunis dilemma-the elimination of the priorities of the past by cre-
ation of new priorities for the present and the future.
Most of the protest and objections to the creation of these new pri-
orities so far have been due to the misapplication of Brown's demand
for unsegregated (unitary) schools by viewing unsegregated as meaning
the same as integrated.95 Integration was ordered in a few severe mixed
de facto and de jure situations, not in pure de facto situations.9 6 Later
courts grasped these few hard core decisions and by misunderstanding
them, misused them. This misuse led to massive "chromatic cross-
94. Assuming such magazines as Readers' Digest, Commentary and America to be
somewhat attuned to the reflective of grass root sentiments.
95. See Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1973) (Weick & O'Sullivan,
JJ., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (1973) (Hale, CJ., dissenting).
96. Bell v. City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963). School Comm. v. Board of Educ.,
277 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1967). But see Keyes v. School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Col. 1970),
modified, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), rev'd in part and remanded, 409 U.S. 818 (1973).
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hauling, '97 which has obscured the basic constitutional issue of equal
protection of the law.
It must be conceded that in many instances the effects of segregation
were so severe that forced integration was the only way to begin the
desegregation process. 8 It must also be conceded that such use of
power, in a governmental form based on the consent of the governed,
must be a restrained power.
Integration so far, to the extent that it has been successful when it
has been ordered, has worked because there has been .basic grass-roots
support, and no effective opposition. The war is over. Integration now
faces the problem of a few minor skirmishes, but it is essentially di-
rected toward reconstruction and winning the peace. It should be a
matter of great concern to all to find the precise point in time where
grass-roots support of forced integration and affirmative action will
turn to grass-roots opposition. Once the opposition begins to grow
there is always the danger of a reaction which may reverse the gains of
Brown and return America to the "us" and "them" of the pre-Brown
era. This, too, is a serious sociological aspect of DeFunis: whether its
existence signals the emergence of a rational opposition to reverse dis-
crimination. It was the influence of sociology that forced the Brown
decision; it also has the potential to neutralize or reverse Brown-some-
thing that no one wants.
A new chapter in race relations has begun. The momentum of the
affirmative action concept of equality may carry the equality of Brown
far beyond the grass-roots concept of equality. Obviously, there are con-
flicting opinions as to the precise meaning of equality in sociology and
law. The sociological concept is necessarily subjective; the legal con-
cept must be objective.
Equality in law does not mean social, cultural, and economic equality
-homogenization. It does mean equal treatment by the law. The
courts have consistently asserted this.99 It is not the function of the law
97. Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(dictum).
98. See, e.g., Swan v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 US. 1 (1970); Alexander
v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v.
County Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 329 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Tenn.
1971).
99. See Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1230 (1971)
(desegregation-ratios); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1970)
(educational balancing-ratios); United States v. Smith, 464 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1972) (crim-
inal); Andrus v. Turner, 421 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1970) (habeas corpus-sentencing); United
States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969)
(habeas corpus-mental health); Communist Party v. Austin, 362 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mich.
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to force such social-cultural-economic equality, nor can that power be
used to create or sanction legal inequality. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Constitution make reference to all men being equal,
but it means in the eyes of the law. Equality has been interpreted as
meaning: the condition of possessing substantially the same rights,
privileges, and immunities, and being liable to substantially the same
duties.10° No man should be denied the possibility of improving his lot;
there ought to be a general condition of openers so that anyone by a
conscientious effort may better himself and indeed that there should
be no limit for possible improvement, certainly no limit set or sup-
ported by law.10 1 This latter statement tends to lend credence to the
equal protection argument used by plaintiff DeFunis. The decision in
DeFunis shows that in the name of equality, and in the effort to make
manifest that which was quoted above by Jarrett, the opposite has now
occurred. There have been limits set for the self improvement of some,
limits set and supported by law.
The state of Washington recognized that the availability of equal
opportunity for higher education has been the major instrument of
social mobility and independence of parental social status.10 2 The state
correctly recognized a compelling interest to ensure that the citizen
who has been wronged in educational opportunity be provided a rem-
edy. The wrong (past discrimination), even though of a social and non-
state-sanctioned variety, must be overcome to ensure social mobility
and legal equality of all.
To do this, Washington has advanced the principle of remedying a
non-legal wrong to a class by imposing a legal disadvantage on another
class. This, too, is a major problem in the DeFunis issues.
III. ... AND THE LAW
The Washington Supreme Court considered three legal issues ad-
vanced by the respondent (plaintiff DeFunis) and the appellant (de-
1973) (access to ballot); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (voting redis-
tricting); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972)
(spouse legal name). Although these cases concede that such inequality must be tested
against the compelling state interest test, it still leaves open the questions of reverse dis-
crimination as a compelling state interest.
100. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 631 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
101. JARRE-r, THE MEANING OF EQUAIrTY, COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
THE CONDITIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY 3, 14 (Supp. 1971).
102. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973).
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fendant President Odegaard et al. of the University of Washington),
and one additional procedural argument advanced by the appellant.
Evidently there were numerous amicus briefs filed on behalf of appel-
lants and from the commentary in respondent's brief they must have
been lengthy Brandeis type briefs on sociology and the law.
Appellant's procedural allegation that Mr. DeFunis had no standing
to question the university admissions policy was rapidly dismissed by
the court, which stated that plaintiff had a "personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy."'103 Considering the remainder of the opinion,
this could hardly be viewed as a valuable concession to the plaintiff.
The court could easily have decided against the plaintiff on this point
and voided the original superior court decree. Because of the impor-
tance of the issues involved, however, it elected to assume the respon-
sibility of a formal decision based on the merits of the other three legal
issues. 0 4
Respondent had alleged that the Washington constitution required
preference be given to Washington residents. 10 5 The trial court's
view to the contrary was sustained. The dissenting opinion by Chief
Judge Hale challenged this as:
...another invidious form of discrimination-that against the
residents of this state. According to some members of the admis-
sions committee, the school has a goal to become a "national" law
school .... 106
In spite of the dissent's obvious concern for the Washington taxpayers,
this portion of the decision is clearly correct. There were no statutory
or constitutional prohibitions on non-resident students except for pro-
visions on tuition. According to the present state of the law it would
not be illegal, if, by sheer chance an entering class consisted solely of
non-residents. The court held this to be a legislative matter and not an
appropriate area for judicial determination or intervention.
The remaining two issues are the heart of the case and the problem.
The first was DeFunis' challenge to the procedures as being illegal, and
the second was a charge that he had been denied equal protection of
the law. The reported decision stated that respondent (plaintiff) had
alleged that the ... procedures employed by the law school in select-
103. Id. at 1177.
104. Id. at 1177 n.6.
105. Id. at 1187-88.
106. Id. at 1189-90.
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ing first year'students constitute arbitrary ind capricious administrative
action . *,"',°7 It further stated that respondent challenged the proce-
dure as arbitrary and capricious because ". . - it deviated from the rela-
tive numerical ranking provided by the PFYA's, [and] .. .by taking
subjective factors into consideration, and weighing them differently for
different applicants, the committee arbitrarily denied- him admnis-
sion,"'08. .and because ". . . no inquiry was made into the background
of each minority applicant to make certain that the individual was in
fact educationally, economically, and culturally deprived."0 9.
Therein is an example of the advantage 'of -having the last word on a
subject. Respondent's arguments, as reported. in the decision, do not
match the arguments as presented in his brief. In fact, respondent's
brief challenged the procedure as arbitrary and capricious due to the
fact that there were no objective standards.11 "0
Respondent challenged the admissions decisions on two closely re-
lated but nevertheless separate bases. First, that the :committee *was
taking into consideration criteria listed as "other things,""'1 with no
published standards or guidelines to assist or control the committee in
the application of their judgment and discretion .(respondent's allega-
tion of no objective standards). This has the effect of the committee
working. with, unbridled discretion-the very .essence, of a charge of
arbitrary and capricious state action.
The second challenge was against the use of subjective criteria at all.
In short, he evidently .suggests that the committee could use only quan-
tifiable data on which all men can agree. The court generally ignored
the first challenge and elected to concentrate. on the second. Here, re-
spondent's implied suggestion of exclusive use. of. objective criteria is
of course unworkable and undesirableI Even the publishers, of objec-
tiye tests, such as, LSAT,: caution against exclusive use of test scores.
The use of objective criteria cannot perse exclude the use of subjective
criteria nor discretion. It is possible that the Supre,me Court, the appel-
lant, and the respondent could agree on .this.
Respondent's overlooked point was the lack of objective standards: to
guide the- admissions committee in .its subjective evaluations of the
107. Id. at 1185.
108. Id. at 1186.
109. Id. at 1187.
110. Brief for Respondents at 21, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. -2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169
(1973).




candidates. Without such standards, respondent continued, it may be
possible that his rejection (or any one else's) could be due to ". . . the
color of his hair, his religion, his political views, or the fact that he was
Jewish." 112 He concluded:
There was nothing in the system of student selection that assured
equal treatment or equal protection of the laws to those who might
offend the prejudices of the selection committee .... [T]he failure
to have objective standards for the ultimate determination of se-
lection invalidates the whole system.1 "
To answer these allegations, the court elected to look at the "goals
of the law school, pursuant to which the policy and procedures of the
admissions committee have been formulated,' 114 rather than the state
code,"35 which delegated the power and duty to the university to estab-
lish entrance requirements."" The court went on to discuss those goals,
but the explanation is so buried in carefully phrased educational jargon
as to be almost meaningless. Within the jumble, however, is the con-
cession that it was the law school's intention to increase the number of
minority students in the law school so as to eventually increase the
number of minority individuals in the legal profession.1 7 Considering
the history of minorities and the law, this is certainly a worthwhile ob-
jective. As a goal, no one could honestly quarrel with it-not even Mr.
DeFunis.
The court answered his objection as to objective criteria by follow-
ing the Griggs v. Duke Power Co."" theory on the exclusive use of the
LSAT and PFYA-the "game of numbers"-and supported the law
school committee's view on the necessity for sensitivity and flexibil-
ity. 1 9 It also approved the committee's consideration of the candidate's
racial and ethnic background as a constitutionally valid criterion. The
court further found that there was no investigation of the individual's
background "to make certain [he] .was in fact educationally or cultur-
ally deprived,"' 20 but seemed to say this investigation may be irrelevant
by stating that:
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id.
114. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1185 (1973).
115. WAsm. Rxv. CoDE I 28B.20.130(3) (1970).
116. 507 P.2d at 1172.
117. Id. 507 P.2d at 1175.
118. 401 US. 424 (1971).




... every minority lawyer is critically needed, whether he be rich
or poor. A showing of actual deprivation is unnecessary for the
accomplishment of the compelling state interest.121
It would not be unreasonable to assume that the court, by these com-
ments, is maintaining the appropriate test is not deprivation or disad-
vantage, but race per se, which is exactly the thrust of respondent's
equal protection argument.
The court, in its analysis of the admissions procedure, accepted the
view presented by the various appellant witnesses and original defen-
dants, who convinced the court that the process "did employ predeter-
mined standards and procedures in selecting students"' 22 and that this
process was not "so unreasonable and in disregard of the facts and cir-
cumstances as to constitute arbitrary and capricious action."'
Dissenting Chief Judge Hale, however, who read the same records,
was of the contrary opinion, and submitted portions of the record
which indicated to him that "the law school failed to apply even its
own vague, loose and whimsical standards."' 24
It would not be unfair to note here that the existence of objective
standards and their application were in dispute. Since the majority had
already determined that the objective of the admissions policy is "not
to separate the races, but to bring them together"'125 and that
.. in some circumstances a racial intention may be used-and in-
deed in some circumstances must be used-by public educational
institutions in bringing about racial balance. School systems which
were formerly segregated de jure now have an affirmative duty to
remedy racial imbalance' 26
The court, citing as examples the Green and Swann v. Charlotte
Mecklenburg Board of Education12 7 cases, used them as precedent for its
finding not only of a rational basis, but as satisfying the compelling
state interest test.'28 The court, in so leaning, ignored or misunderstood
the differences between de facto and de jure segregation. As a rule
courts do not interfere where there is only de facto segregation. This
court indicated its awareness of this when it cited Swann's comment on
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1191.
125. Id. at 1179.
126. Id.
127. 402 US. 1 (1970).
128. 507 P.2d at 1184.
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"a remedy to correct past constitutional violations.", 29 Swann (and the
others) were in fact dealing with a hard core de jure situation, while
Washington was at best, if at all, a de facto situation.
The court was not convincing in its reliance on these cases as valid
precedent, as they were basic hard core de facto and de jure desegre-
gation cases, while the case in point was a "reverse discrimination"
situation. In fact, the court never indicated a finding of de facto segre-
gation in the University of Washington, merely a minority imbalance
at the national level.13 0
Considering the number of amicus briefs, 13' and their emphasis on
sociological persuasion, it would not be improper to conclude that in
response to respondent's allegations of arbitrary and capricious action
the court was willing to accept the questionable admission procedure
because it had been persuaded by the briefs and law review articles to
adopt the theory of reverse discrimination as compelling. Once ac-
cepted as a goal (end), virtually any procedure (means) would have to
be acceptable.
The final argument was the conflict between respondent's allegation
of denial of equal protection and the court's view that reverse discrimi-
nation was and is a compelling social reform. The court summarized
the essence of plaintiff's fourteenth amendment arguments:
... that the law school violated his right to equal protection of the
laws by denying him admission, yet accepting certain minority
applicants with lower PFYA's than plaintiff who, but for their mi-
nority status, would not have been admitted.182
Respondent's brief stated it somewhat differently:
Plaintiff was entitled to have his application for law school admis-
sion judged on the same basis and by the same criteria as all other
applicants. The failure to consider all applicants on the same basis
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws .... 18
In a sense, plaintiff was judged on the same basis as other applicants,
in that he was judged objectively against other non-minority groups,
while the minority students were judged on the same basis as against
other minority students. The principal problem here was the use of
129. Id. at 1180.
130. Id. at 1175.
131. Supra note 110, at 36.
132.. 507 P.2d at 1178.
133. Supra note 110, at 7. Brief for Respondent at 7, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d
11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
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different criteria for each group, where the groups had been defined by
race. As plaintiff expressed it:
... the privilege of being considered separately and having less em-
phasis placed on the grade point averages and the LSAT scores
than other applicants was made available exclusively to students
of certain races.3 4
It may be fair to state the problem as whether different evaluative
criteria may be used for groups that have been determined by race.
On the general proposition of whether racial classifications are un-
constitutional per se, the court stated:
Brown did not hold that all racial classifications are per se uncon-
stitutional; rather it held that invidious racial classifications-i.e.,
those that stigmatize a racial group with the stamp of inferiority-
are unconstitutional.... Preferential admissions do not represent
a covert attempt to stigmatize the majority race as inferior, nor is
it reasonable to expect that a possible effect of the extension of
educational preferences to certain disadvantaged racial minorities
will be to stigmatize whites.3 5
The court then referred to Green and Swann as authorities for their
position that:
... the denial of a "benefit" on the basis of race is not necessarily
a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, if the racial clas-
sification is used in a compensatory way to promote integration.3 6
A search of Brown, Green, and Swann produced no such statement.
At best, this view has been "read into" Brown by the court, either on
its own persuasion, or from the influence of one or more of the sixteen
law review articles cited by appellant. 3 7 Whether these views are socio-
logically appropriate is not the point; what is important is that they
are original in modem law.
The court also considered whether the "rational basis" test or the
"compelling interest" test is more correct under the circumstances of
this case, and concluded, as did respondent, that the latter test is appro-
priate. It conceded that since it is a racial classification that is involved,
the latter test is demanded, and the law school has the burden "to show
134. Id. at 9.
135. 507 P.2d at 1179.
136. Id. at 1181.





that its consideration of races in admitting students is necessary to the
accomplishment of a compelling state interest."'18 In its discussion of
this test, the court noted the underrepresentation of minority groups
in the law schools and the minority groups' equal participation in the
tax support of the law school and determined, therefore, that the state
had a compelling interest in eliminating racial imbalance within pub-
lic legal education. 18 9
The court really cannot be criticized for the lack of a legal rationale
in its opinion-a legal rationale was never intended. The court was
adequately persuaded by the record of the social and moral aspects of
imbalance, and decided it must act. It grasped at the available straws
to rationalize what it considered a necessary result.
A developmental point which may have escaped notice in the court's
reasoning is the inevitable application of the now "DeFunis principle"
to all public collegiate education, public professional and graduate
schools, and possibly public office, including, but certainly not limited
to, the Washington judiciary.
The court next answered respondent's charge that there was no find-
ing of any de facto segregation, much less de jure, when it introduced
a new twist to that legal distinction:
The de jure-de facto distinction is not controlling in determining
the constitutionality of the minority admissions policy voluntarily
adopted by the law school.140
Apparently, this means that racial classifications, priorities, and dis-
criminations by the state are valid as long as they are voluntary. After
these strained exercises in logic, the court eventually admitted the so-
cial basis for its decision when it discussed the under-representation of
minorities in the legal profession as a result of prior segregation and
its after-effects. It asserted that without such a remedial program this
underrepresentation might be perpetuated indefinitely, and this "...
minority admissions policy... [is] the only feasible plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."' 4 ' The
court then concluded that the defendants had shown the necessity for
the racial classification to the accomplishment of an overriding state
138. 507 P.2d at 1182.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1183.
141. Id. at 1184, citing Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
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interest, and had thus sustained the heavy burden imposed on them by
the equal protection provision of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the decision as to the equal protection problem was cor-
rect, the analysis of the need was correct, and the need for corrective
measures was correct, the court overlooked the major point of the re-
spondent's equal protection argument. Conceding the minorities' con-
stitutional protection from detrimental racial-ethnic classifications, it
must also be conceded that Mr. DeFunis, as an individual citizen of the
United States, also has the right to constitutional protection from detri-
mental racial-ethnic classifications. The court has determined the pro-
tection of certain minorities as a class to be superior to the respondent's
right as an individual-or, to put it another way, the court has deter-
mined that the Constitution holds all persons to be equal in the eyes
of the law, but some are more equal than others, depending on the
racial-ethnic classification.
In its correct assessment of the need for some kind of remedial or
compensatory action, the court overlooked the individual rights of its
citizens, conferring a blanket benefit on others which the court admits
is inevitably prejudicial ("not benign") for others.142 The court's opin-
ion, which concentrated on the rights of minorities, virtually over-
looked or ignored the rights of this individual respondent and all
others similarly affected.
Taken as a treatise on the need for corrective action to remedy the
results of ancient wrongs, the court's opinion is an excellent work and
quite persuasive, although not as detailed and persuasive as the two
law review articles from which it adopted most of its opinion.14 It did
not rely on the law; it created new law based on sociology, much as its
predecessor Brown. Brown, however, tried to eliminate legal racial dis-
crimination; DeFunis merely reversed the roles, and justified it. The
court has decided to substitute one wrong (racial preferences) for an-
other (racial discrimination) in the name of the Constitution of the
United States and on the alleged authority of the Supreme Court of
the United States. A very vigorous dissenting opinion stated:
Racial bigotry, prejudice and intolerance will never be ended by
exalting the political rights of one group or class over that of an-
other. The circle of inequality cannot be broken by shifting the
142. Id. at 1182.
143. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Access to Legal Education, 1970 TOL.
L. REv. 281; O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing The Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971).
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inequities from one man to his neighbor. To aggrandize the first
will, to the extent of the aggrandizement, diminish the latter.
There is no remedy at law except to abolish all class distinctions
heretofore existing in law. For that reason, the constitutions are
and ever ought to be color blind.144
Although this quote sounds like Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Plessy in 1896, it is in fact from the dissenting opinion of Chief
Judge Hale in DeFunis, seventy-seven years laterl I
IV. STATE INTEREST-COMPELLING OR STRAINED
The DeFunis decision is an excellent sociological analysis of the jus-
tification for the original Brown orders. Following this unnecessary
justification, the court found that the state was compelled to take some
kind of compensatory-affirmative action for past segregations and dis-
criminations. In doing so it generally adopted the theories and argu-
ments of the two O'Neil articles145 submitted by the appellants. This
function of state government, easily justified under the blanket of pro-:
motion of the general welfare, although not in issue, was given exten-
sive coverage.
A matter that was in issue, the resulting benefits to one class of citi-
zens selected by racial-ethnic criteria, and the consequent legal disad-
vantage to another, chosen by the same criteria, was generally ignored.
In partial justification of its view, the court misstated the landmark
case of Brown and its progeny, and concentrated on the evils of the past
racial-ethnic discriminations to permit new racial-ethnic discrimina-
tions to be placed on innocent generations to come. It also ignored the
rights due an individual citizen in favor of newly created class privi-
leges. Nowhere in the opinion was there due consideration of Mr.
DeFunis as a citizen of the United States.
Granted the compelling state interest in preventing invidious racial-
ethnic discriminations, there remains a logical non sequitur when that
same interest is used to justify a new form of de jure discrimination.
No judge comes to the bench with a mind which resembles a tabula
rasa. On the contrary, he comes with mental sets, value judgments, and
interests. To deny this would be to deny a fact of life. Even our com-
mon speech betrays a recognition of that truth. Terms like "conser-
144. 507 P.2d at 1189. (Hale, CJ., dissenting).
145. See note 143 supra.
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vative court," "judicial activism," "abuse of discretion," "shock the
conscience of the court" and other non-computerable expressions all
bear witness to the place of subjectivity in court decisions and opinions.
This subjectivity is the only possible explanation of the DeFunis
opinion. Certainly, existing law did not mandate it since Brown, Swann
and their progeny did not deal with situations where there was no find-
ing of de jure or de facto segregation. In place of such findings the
court relied on recognizing "well known" practices of discrimination
in the past against the named groups. 146 It decided that the goal-quota-
priority system was a desirable method to remedy those past wrongs. It
was desirable, ergo it should be done.
This is not an attempt to discuss the philosophies or merits of judicial
activism, but merely an attempt to identify DeFunis as one of its vital
progeny.
In order to sustain its position of "compelling" and to continue to be
logical, Washington must continue the process of identification of any
and all racial or ethnic groups that fall within the DeFunis test: any
racial or ethnic group that shows a current or past history of socio-
economic-cultural disadvantage, using their ratio of representation in
the various professions as prima facie evidence. This should not be
too difficult. Virtually every racial-ethnic group can show a current
and/or past history of invidious discrimination due to its race, creed,
or national origin. 147 It is merely a question of evidence or a bold
positive act. Assuming DeFunis is sustained, any law school faculty or
government agency who wishes to decree any ethnic group as a priority
group just does so; DeFunis operates to give that act the force and effect
of law.
At this point, another question arises relative to a serious implication
in the DeFunis decree: that discrimination against Whites is acceptable
("not unconstitutional")1 48 and possibly compelling as long as it is in
favor of the recognized members of the priority-quota classes. The
Washington court noted that the state is compelled to do this in order
"to bring the races together.' 49 While one may wonder about a judicial
decision claiming that state racial classification and discrimination are
compelling, one may also wonder about the "togetherness" reactions
of the non-priority ethnics in Washington (and the United States, if
146. 507 P.2d at 1175.
147. See generally M. NovAK, THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS (1972).
148. See also Gonzales v. Fairfax, No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July 27, 1973).
149. 507 P.2d at 1179.
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DeFunis is affirmed) when and if this currently insignificant decree
becomes officially and judicially implemented on a nationwide scale.150
In any event, "togetherness" is now a compelling state interest in
Washington.
V. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
From the time of Brown, social-economic-educational-legal progress
can be identified by specific phases. Since the stages varied by state,
target and objective, chronological overlapping prevents any meaning-
ful dating. The phases, however, are readily identifiable: segregation,
desegregation, integration, compensatory actions, affirmative action,
priorities, and quotas.
Brown is an agreed historical starting point for desegregation; Green,
Griffin, and Swann introduced positive integration as a corrective de-
vice where there was de facto segregation caused by previous de jure
segregation activities. Educational institutions began the compensatory
programs. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the directives of the Depart-
ment of Labor, and President Johnson's Executive Order' 51 relative to
racial compliance by government contractors can be considered as the
start of formal affirmative action. This initial affirmative action, how-
ever, was mandatory only as to the prevention of discriminatory hiring
practices; it was designed to encourage compensatory affirmative action
in the field of employment practices and did not suggest goals, quotas,
or reverse discrimination.
Following the lead, many colleges and universities introduced com-
pensatory affirmative action admissions programs.1 52 At the same time,
the federal courts were utilizing ratio-quotas of students and faculty
based on racial-ethnic classifications in their attenmpts to "eliminate
root and branch" the long term de facto effects of the prior de jure
segregation.153 Affirmative action activists in education soon became
impatient with the slow progress of the voluntary compliance program;
those in positions of power began to introduce their own brand of
150. See Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477 F.2d 851, 860 (6th Cir. 1973) (Weick & O'Sullivan,
JJ., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (1973) (Hale, CJ., dissenting).
151. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965); see also UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HIGHER EDUCATION GUDELINES (Oct. 1972).
152. Seabury, H.E.W. & The University, 54 COMMENTARY 30 (1972); Can All Americans
Be Made "Equal"?, US. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 9, 1973, at 39.
153. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
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affirmative action into the educational sphere parallel to those in the
employment programs. They took the ratio concept from the de jure-
integration decisions and the executive order concept of affirmative
action-compliance and, by an amalgam, produced the goal-priority-
quota progression.
To implement this they required all federal and state agencies, and
all other persons and agencies who do business with the government,
to answer a series of particular questions about their racial-ethnic-per-
sonnel structure, which of necessity required each employee to have
been classified by racial and national origins.
Whatever their purpose, racial-ethnic classifications are here by gov-
ernment action. As with any government function, activity, or agency,
it is, or will become, permanent. The goal-quotas concept and the ac-
companying racial-ethnic classification of all citizens are now in effect
in business employment, union membership, government contracts,
government employment, and public and private education.
When "minority groups" were originally identified by and for the
Department of Labor and HEW, they were essentially Negro/Black,
Mexican-American/Spanish surnamed, and American Indian. In the
state of Washington, at the law school, by university determination,
the "minority" priority groups were: "Black Americans, Chicano Amer-
icans, American Indians, and Phillipine Americans.""
By October, 1972, the direction of racial-ethnic classification showed
itself, and the application of the grow or die principle, in a novel case
involving the San Francisco School Board and (approximately) 4,000
of its "Other White" administrative and teaching personnel. 55 The
school board had previously adopted a policy of affirmative action,
wherein the faculty would "more closely approximate the racial and
ethnic distribution of the total school population.' u5 6 Although not
reported in the decision, it has been reported elsewhere, that following
HEW guidelines ". .. the San Francisco authorities used nine categories
in making their determination: Negro/Black, Chinese, Japanese, Ko-
rean, American Indian, Filipino, Other non-White, Spanish speaking/
Spanish Surname, and Other-White."' 15 7 Evidently the program was
neither protested nor contested during the time of equalization of op-
portunity, but when that affirmative action turned to a "de-selection"
154. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1973).
155. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Calif. 1972).
156. Id. at 251.
157. Raab, Quotas by Any Other Name, 54 COMMENTAnY 41 (Jan. 1972).
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(demotion) of "Other White" administrators, 158 the predictable and
inevitable explosive reaction sent the school board's program to the
United States district court in San Francisco.
As in DeFunis, the trial court followed the "Constitution is color-
blind" theory, found an invidious racial discrimination against Whites
and enjoined the San Francisco School Board from further implemen-
tation of its "declassification" plan.159 In this case, the defendant school
board chose not to appeal.
Living things appear to be bound by the principle of grow or die.
The same rule can be said to apply to governmental activities, includ-
ing affirmative action. It would seem safe to predict the expansion or
demise of the affirmative action racial-ethnic quota programs. The
United States Supreme Court, as it rules on the obviously moot ques-
tion of whether Mr. DeFunis could be displaced by a minority group
member as such, will be charting the more important course of race
relationships for the future.
VI. CLASSIFICATIONS AND DISCiUMINATIONS
The classification of individuals into racial, religious, ethnic, or other
demographic categories is a politically and morally neutral act. It is
not the act of a demographer or census bureau clerk that causes a person
to be Italian, Irish, English, Catholic, Jewish, Negro, Spanish, Oriental,
male or female.
The process of classification of individuals by governmental act is of
itself innocuous. It is the political consequences of the classification
that are best termed as discrimination. Discrimination is the subjective
judgmental process whereby the differences and distinctions between
the members of the classified groups is (for purposes of this article)
governmentally noted for future action. The result is inevitably and
eventually a benefit for some and a burden for others.
The assigned benefit or burden is the consequence of the discrimina-
tory act, not the classification act. No great uproar has ever been created
as a result of the classification process. When government utilizes its
power to note the differences and enacts discriminatory legislation, it
may produce mild waves of resentment in totalitarian states, but has
always caused resentment and reaction in democratically oriented
158. 357 F. Supp. at 251-52.
159. Id. at 255.
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political structures, since the act is so contrary to the essence of the
democratic concept.
That is admittedly good theory, but it must be admitted and recog-
nized that compromises have to be made between the ideal and the
demands and needs of the political subjects. These compromises are
generally made by the legislature, by the process known as legislation.
Even this process must be considered as more theoretical than real in
this decade as the process of judicial legislation, executive order, and
government by administrative board regulations are becoming more
common and accepted.
When American governmental units classify and adopt discrimina-
tory legislation, rules, and orders, they become subject to challenges
based upon the original Constitution and the first, fifth and fourteenth
amendments. In response to those challenges the governmental units
must allege compelling state or national interest to justify their in-
vasion of protected areas. Some types of discrimination, such as the
granting of titles of nobility, are so repugnant to the American spirit
that they have never been attempted. Others have been tolerated until
the United States Supreme Court has solemnly declared them to be con-
trary to the Constitution. 160
While some forms of racial discrimination were held to be unconsti-
tutional shortly after the Civil War, others hung on until the Brown
decision led the way to wholesale invalidations of ordinances, statutes,
and rules which adversely affected people because of their race or ethnic
origin. From the time of Brown, it has been repeated doctrine that as
to the law, "our Constitution is color blind." 16 The generations from
Plessy on labored to have the Constitution be applied as if it were
colorblind. The generation from Brown has labored mightily to have
160. As examples of groups discriminated against until the United States Supreme
Court acted are: servicemen, O'Callaghan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); atheists, Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); ex-soldiers, Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); military
dependents, Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1 (1957); aliens, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); ex-confederates, Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 356 (1867).
Some of these issues were mixed with others such as jury trial and bills of attainder, but
the common thread is the singling out of the group for different and discriminatory treat-
ment.
161. United States v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966),
aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 840 (1967), cert. denied sub nom. Caddo Parish School Bd., 389
U.S. 840 (1967); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1180 (1973); McAuliffe, School De-
segregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination, 57 VA. L. R.v. 65 (1971);
Comment, Increasing Minority Admissions in Law School-Reversed Discrimination?,
20 BUFF. L. Rav. 473, 481 (1971); see also O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the
Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971).
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color blindness in education, employment, unions, law, business, in-
dustry, realty, recreation and sociology. Today there are forces which
claim that this same Constitution can continue to be color blind only
if it is color conscious1 62 or perhaps better stated, that colorblindness
is now immoral. The sophistication of the distinction is irrelevant since
DeFunis claims that it is now constitutionally permissible to classify
and discriminate on the basis of race and ethnic background when it
serves a compelling state interest.
Whatever rationale is expounded, the fact cannot be ignored that
the doctrine is, purely and simply, just another invidious discrimina-
tion based on race. It cannot be avoided or denied-it is inescapable.
Merely because the Washington Supreme Court sanctioned the practice
does not change the fact that they have judicially authorized a prefer-
ential treatment based not only on race, but ethnic background.
In the religious discrimination cases, especially those relative to the
establishment clause, the theme has been repeated so often as to sound
like a litany, that the Constitution is not concerned with the degree
of encroachment, it prohibits any encroachment at all.16s It insists that
"Congress shall make no law. ' "
So too as to the discriminations based on race, either they are pro-
hibited or not. If the former, then the DeFunis decision is wrong and
must be reversed. If the latter, then discrimination based on race is
not wrong, if for a good purpose. In that event, discrimination based
on creed, national origins, and previous conditions of servitude should
not be wrong, so long as it is for a good purpose. It may be a situation
such as Walz v. Tax Commissioner,'6 5 where the Supreme Court noted
that as to these strict constrictions, there may "be room for play in
the joints.166 Applying the DeFunis theory, the government must find
various poverty or disadvantaged pockets, determine the race or ethnic
origin and decree that ethnic, race or religious group to be a disadvan-
162. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36, 50 (2d Cir. 1961); McAuliffe, School De-
segregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination, 57 VA. L REv. 65, 80 (1971);
Rabinove, Law School Minorities: What Price Admissions?, AmEmcA, Apr. 28, 1973 at 387.
163. See Sloan v. Lemon, 93 S. Ct. 2982 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Ed. & Religious
Liberty, 93 S. Ct. 2814 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
164. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
165. 597 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
166. Id. at 669.
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taged group and therefore entitled to protection. This concept is
neither new nor startling.167 Ethnic groups are already protected by
law:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or
threat of force, wilfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or
attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with . . . . (2) any
person because of his race, color, religion or national origin .... 16s
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of any place of public accomodations, as defined in this
section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin.
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 69
This same proscription is repeated a number of times in 42 U.S.C.
§,2000ff (1970). It may be of interest here to indicate a statement on
this view which was made before the Civil War by one fighting for
what eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1866:
He may be poor, weak, humble, or black-he may be of caucasian,
Jewish, Indian, or Ethopian race-he may be of French, German,
English, or Irish extraction, but before the Constitution of Massa-
chusetts, all these distinctions disappear. He is not poor, weak,
humble, or black; nor is he French, German, English, or Irish; he
is a MAN, the equal of all his fellowmen 70
The unfortunate aspect of any governmentally sponsored benefit
program-is the natural tendency of everyone to demand benefits from
167. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477
F.2d 851, 855, 859-60 (6th Cir. 1973) (Weick & O'Sullivan, JJ., dissenting); Anderson v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248, 249-50 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Auerbach v.
African Teachers Ass'n, 356 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Cook, School Desegregation:
To Brown and Back Again-The Great Circle, 23 BAY. L. R.Ev. 398 (1971); McAuliffe,
School Desegregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination, 57 VA. L Ray. 65
(1971); Comment, From Brown to Swann-The New Role of Equity in Integration, 23
BAY. L. REv. 555 (1971). See generally Abrams, The Quota Commission, 54 COMMENTARY
54 (Oct. 1972); Raab, Quotas by Any Other Name, 53 CommENTARY 41 (Jan. 1972); Rab-
inove, Law School Minorities: What Price Admission?, AMERCA, Apr. 28, 1973 at 387;
Ross, Why Quotas Won't Work, 102 REAEns D GSr 51 (1973).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
169. Id.
170. 2 WoRKs OF CHARL s SUmNER 341 (1874), as reported in Frank & Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 1972 WAsH. L.Q. 421, 437 n.39
(emphasis added).
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the largesse. No doubt every racial and ethnic group can find some
disadvantage, organize, and then demonstrate for recognition. Political
expediency will require the acceptance of those demands and the grant-
ing of the appropriate benefits based on that discrimination. If the
legislatures do not act, the courts, to be consistent, must act. And so the
list will grow.
VII. "NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:" RACIAL-
ETHNIC QUOTAS AS A POLITICAL NECESSITY
The present listing of "minority" racial-ethnic categories has been
expanded to include at least nine classifications. There is also the
additional classification of sex-affirmative action for females. Some-
where in government files is another special category of disadvantaged
Whites, generally labeled "Appalachians," for which there is some
priority benefit.
There is certainly a rational basis for these classifications for which
some compensatory affirmative action benefit would appear appropriate.
Each constitutes a class of persons who have suffered educational or
occupational disadvantages through no fault of its own. It may be from
race, creed, color, national origin, accident of birth, geographic loca-
tion, or economic disaster. This type of classification is unobjectionable
in that government is coming to the aid of its citizens who are, or have
become, disadvantaged. Indeed, this is a legitimate and proper function
of government.
American governmental units have properly elected to assist those
in need to obtain a better job, job training or education. They have
applied the test of need to a group or class of persons who have a past
or present history of negative discrimination. For twenty years they
have attempted to remedy the racial-ethnic wrongs and make restitu-
tion to the extent that any government can. They have, however,
stopped short of the goal by limitation of the groups to only the very
obvious. Had they continued to apply the test, they would have found
many other group disadvantage situations on a local or national scale.
Every state or city has groups of citizens in disadvantaged pockets
which are readily identifiable by race, culture, or national origin-
"Ethnics." Now, to provide equal protection of the laws, one of the
most basic of the democratic tenets, and to maintain consistency, the
test must be applied to all races and all ethnics if it is to be applied at
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all. The "colorblind constitution" demands it, Congress demands it, the
courts have demanded it, and the increasing numbers of individuals
adversely affected by affirmative action will demand it. Then the more
serious problem is inevitable. As each new group is added to the pref-
erential minorities list, the non-preferential ethnics will have their
share of educational and employment opportunities decreased, which
in turn will stimulate them to get on the other (priorities) list.
The next step is political. Once any ethnic group has organized and
shown its qualifications, politics would require governmental accep-
tance of this new group. What political candidate of the future would
dare to follow the usual practice of whirlwind tours through the ethnic
neighborhoods, eating their kielbasi, pizza, strudels, or stuffed cabbage
in return for their votes, without a promise of equality of treatment for
that ethnic group. Carrying out such promises can only be done by
specific legislative enactment. Vote swapping and horse trading will
produce the appropriate legislation. Either ethnics will be added, or
the programs will terminate. The latter is politically inexpedient-
rather, political suicide. So the list grows.
Obviously, it is only a question of time before everyone will declare
an ethnic identity in order to get priorities. Within a very short period,
the only group without priorities will be the WASPs, who by then
should be sufficiently legally disadvantaged to qualify as members of
a legally disadvantaged minority group, so they too, will be finally
declared a disadvantaged minority. The effective result here will be
that 100 per cent of the population will eventually belong to the pri-
ority group. At this stage, priorities will no longer resolve the problem
of the disadvantaged, as priorities for all are no longer priorities. An-
other more permanent remedy will have to be found. The government
must either abandon the whole program of priorities or adopt a formal
racial-ethnic quota program.
With what frequency does any well established government agency-
program voluntarily decide, on an altruistic basis, that its job is done,
the agency should be disbanded, and the employees let go? In fact, ter-
minations of such programs take positive action by the legislative or
executive branches-a political (not managerial) decision. By what
stretch of the imagination will the minorities who have been granted
priorities by law, based on racial or ethnic considerations, voluntarily
surrender their advantages?171
171. "Once you grant people a special privilege, you can as easily take it back from
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No matter the approach, the final decision will have to be legislative
or executive. One could not conceive of any chief executive choosing
voluntarily to end his political career by terminating a benefit for any
power group of his electorate. Such suicide is a rare political act.
So far as the legislature is concerned, it is faced with the same political
expediency or death problems as the executive branch. Expediency for
individuals of both branches will demand inclusion of ethnics (although
there may be the occasional politician who has a masochistic complex).
Assuming no mass political suicide, it may be assumed there will be
no political termination of the racial-ethnic priorities. Thus, the only
possible alternative must prevail as each group finds in the end that
there are no real priority advantages to mere membership in an official
minority group. Their individual and group survival will depend upon
an allocation of priority chits to their particular group. The allotment
will have to be a fixed number, most likely in proportion to its mem-
bership in the total structure. This is, in fact, the essence, if not neces-
sarily a definition of, quotas.
It is the contention of the authors that the natural and probable
consequences of affirming DeFunis are ethnic and racial quotas as an
inevitable national policy in at least employment and education.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The United States Supreme Court has been challenged by the De-
Funis dilemma. A decision to reverse DeFunis may cause the unfortu-
nate and premature termination of compensatory affirmative action
programs. This country has not yet reached the point of maturity and
sophistication such that the ideal of equal opportunity, irrespective of
race or ethnic origin, is possible and probable without governmental
intervention and coercion. Choosing this horn of the dilemma would
result in maintaining the status quo on racial-ethnic assimilation.
An election to affirm DeFunis is to choose the other horn, govern-
ment sponsored and directed racial-ethnic quotas. This result can only
prove that democracy, as we know it, cannot work in a heterogeneous
racial-ethnic population, and the resulting internecine struggles will
be destructive of this experiment in democracy.
The attacks on the University of Washington procedure, as blessed
them as take back meat from a tiger." Quote of Milton Himmelfarb in Glazer & Himmel-
farb, McGovern & the Jews: A Debate, 54 COMMENTARY 43, 49 (Sept. 1972).
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by the Washington Supreme Court, are on two grounds, due process
and equal protection. Predictions are generally risky enough, but here,
where the legal issues may be obscured by deep seated emotional in-
volvement, they are even more difficult.
In the due process issue, appellant's172 argument that the committee
cannot use any subjective criteria whatever, must be rejected, since
there are few, if any, human activities which can be totally quantified.
However, appellant's complaint of the lack of express guidelines for
making judgments (objective standards), where state action, denial of
a benefit and racial classifications are involved, is a valid issue and must
be answered by the Court. Even though the Court's ultimate evaluation
of the university's procedural due process is contingent on the equal
protection outcome, appellant is correct on the absence of guidelines
for the committee ("no objective standards") as resulting in unbridled
discretion or at least arbitrary and capricious acts, and it must be so
ruled.
To satisfy the demands of equal protection in due process, the ad-
missions procedure may use any job or performance-related criteria it
chooses, 178 but such combination of subjective and objective criteria
must be available to every individual irrespective of class membership.
Once these valid criteria are published (notice), then those portions of
the due process demands will be satisfied. In operation, assuming some
degree of express justification of the results of the subjective evalua-
tions, the emphasis would have to shift from arbitrary and capricious
evaluations, to evaluation on constitutionally permissible criteria, and
once again, the races have equal opportunity. The present writers are
not so naive as to imagine that manipulation of these criteria is not
possible, particularly where subjective judgments are to be made, but
the policing of administrative boards is not too high a price to pay .to
avoid the inherent evils of racial-ethnic discriminations.
The equal protection clause has its own separate demands. The issue
here is whether, assuming no violation of due process, a state may estab-
lish different criteria for groups defined by race or ethnic origin. The
Court has faced this problem many times since Brown, which emphati-
cally ruled against racial classifications in education. This landmark
172. "Appellant" refers to DeFunis' status before the United States Supreme Court.
173. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). See also Note, Civil Rights-
Educational and Testing Requirements-Employment Tests Not to be Given Controlling
Force Unless They are Demonstrably a Reasonable Measure of job Performance, 40 Fow-
HAM L. REV. 350 (1971).
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decision was followed by the civil rights acts which emphasized the
same principle, and expanded it to include not only race and color, but
religion, national origin, and later, sex.174 The Court cannot ignore its
own pronouncements, and those of Congress, that such classifications
are prohibited. Granted the novelty of the Washington decree that
claims these prohibitions are less than absolute when there is a "good
purpose," such as "bringing the races together," it is important to note
that this is Washington law, and a rationalization, not the law of the
United States. The United States Supreme Court cannot accept this
verbal subterfuge.
The Supreme Court has often spoken on the use of racial ratios in
public schools and has approved them for students and teachers in
public education. These directions, however, were a basic redistribu-
tion of the races designed to provide a racial balancing where the im-
balance had been directly or indirectly caused by state action. These
ratios did not cause any student to lose his educational opportunity,
nor deprive him of a free exercise of personal control of his ultimate
vocational choice. The ratios were not designed to cause any teacher
unemployment, but to provide merely a new teaching assignment.175
As a practical solution to a highly emotional and explosive situation,
they helped to keep the peace even though neither side was satisfied.
The affirmative action priority-goal-quota progression is markedly
different from the educational ratio in that the effect of the former
is displacement or, better, exclusion of someone from an educational
or employment opportunity solely because of his or her racial-ethnic
origin. This is positive governmental activity limiting the availability
of educational opportunity and consequent vocational choices on bases
other than ability.17 6 In short, it is governmentally created inequality
in the competition for careers, and that intervention is based upon the
race of those affected. Just as the Court has said that criminality of an
act cannot be based on the race of the actor,177 so it should say that
neither can opportunity be based on the race of the candidates.
The Court faced the problem of racial-ethnic priorities once before,
174. Presently pending is the equal rights amendment.
175. The writers emphasize the word designed, as they are aware of the number of
cases from Brown to the present, where school officials misused the integration of faculty
orders as an excuse for wholesale and individual dismissals of black teachers.
176. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1200 (1973) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
177. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 185 (1964).
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in Hughes v. Superior Court,17 when it sustained the state of Cali-
fornia's injunction against picketing the Lucky stores to force a certain
racial quota hiring. It quoted with approval the California Supreme
Court decision:
It was just such a situation-an arbitrary discrimination upon the
basis of race and color alone, rather than a choice based solely upon
individual qualification for the work to be done-which we con-
demned in the Marinship case .... The fact that those seeking
such discrimination do not demand that it be practiced as to all
employes of a particular employer diminishes in no respect the
unlawfulness of their purpose; they would, to the extent of the
fixed proportion, make the right to work for Lucky dependent not
on fitness for the work nor on an equal right of all, regardless of
race, to compete in an open market, but rather, on membership in
a particular race. If petitioners were upheld in their demand then
other races, white, yellow, brown and red, would have equal rights
to demand discriminatory hiring on a racial basis. Yet that is pre-
cisely the type of discrimination to which petitioners avowedly
object.179
The United States Supreme Court then went on to add its own lan-
guage:
These considerations are most pertinent in regard to a population
made up of so many diverse groups as ours. To deny to California
the right to ban picketing in the circumstances of this case would
mean that there could be no prohibition of the pressure of picket-
ing to secure proportional employment on ancestral grounds of
Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Mil-
waukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San An-
tonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York, and so on
through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations
in various cities. States may well believe that such constitutional
sheltering would inevitably encourage use of picketing to compel
employment on the basis of racial discrimination. In disallowing
such picketing States may act under the belief that otherwise com-
munity tensions and conflicts would be exacerbated. The differ-
ences in cultural traditions instead of adding flavor and variety to
our common citizenry might well be hardened into hostilities by
leave of law. 80
178. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
179. Id. at 463-64 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 464. It should be noted that this case was decided unanimously with one
Justice not participating in the consideration or decision (Douglas), and except for Justice
Vinson and Justice Jackson, this was the same Court that decided Brown four years later.
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In a more recent case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,lsl the Court again
faced the question of preferences for members of a race as members of
a race. The Court, construing a federal statute, stated:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job
to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does
not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member
of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of arti-
ficial arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification.
1 s2
In both Hughes and Griggs the Supreme Court, while not specifically
discussing constitutionality, spoke out against racial-ethnic priority
practices. In DeFunis, it must do no less.
In spite of the sophistry of the Washington court, racial and ethnic
classifications are invidious per se, and there is no interest so compelling
to warrant a breach of this constitutional prohibition. Although this
Supreme Court, which decided Swann, may feel that there are grounds
for "a little play in the joints," there could never be an interest so com-
pelling as to warrant the formal establishment of government sanc-
tioned or directed racial-ethnic priorities.
The principal issue that would affect the original plaintiff, Mr.
DeFunis, was moot when it was before the Washington Supreme Court,
which would make a remand unnecessary. It is only the constitutional
principle that must be decided.
The Supreme Court must be careful not to terminate existing or
proposed compensatory programs for disadvantaged individuals irre-
spective of class. It must, however, reverse DeFunis in such a way as to
terminate the Washington brand of unconstitutional racial-ethnic pri-
orities based on class membership. Class distinctions and privilege have
no place in America.
IX. EPILOG . . . AND PROLOGUE
On April 23, 1974, the Supreme Court decided that the DeFunis case
was moot, although it conceded that the issues were not, and that they
will not go away.1ss
181. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
182. Id. at 431.
183. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 42 U.S.L.W. 4578 (U.S. April 23, 1974).
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It remains for another frustrated law or medical school applicant to
present them in so timely a way that the Court will be forced to decide
the course of affirmative action for the next century.
Only Justice Douglas, in his separate dissent, elected to specifically
comment on the merits.1 84
The nation must now await "DeFunis H."
184. Id. at 4580.
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